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Birth and Death of Governmental Immunity
Verne Lawyer*
M UCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN concerning the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity' and the doubtful justice of its appli-
cation. This article is aimed toward a discussion of the role of
the courts in the rise and decline of the doctrine in the United
States with primary emphasis upon the reasoning behind the
court decisions. The multitude of cases in which this doctrine is
invoked presents a zig-zag pattern of conflict in the thinking of
the courts, some of which adhere to a rigid rule of stare decisis,
others of which attempt to modify and adapt the doctrine to the
rapidly expanding present day litigation, and a few of which
advocate its complete abolition.
I. How the theory originated
The doctrine of governmental immunity as applied in the
United States is that neither the United States nor any of the
several states may be sued by a private citizen without its con-
sent. How the doctrine became a part of the American law is
still a puzzle.
The doctrine seems to have descended from early English
cases based on the maxim "the King can do no wrong." Before
the sixteenth century, sovereign immunity was a purely per-
sonal right of the kings of England. In the feudal structure the
lord of the manor was not subject to suit in his own courts. The
king, the highest feudal lord, enjoyed the same protection. No
court was above him.
This immunity operated more as a lack of jurisdiction in
the king's courts than a denial of total relief. It rarely had the
effect of completely denying compensation. The action could not
be brought in the king's courts because they had no jurisdiction
to hear claims against him, but there was jurisdiction in the
Court of Exchequer for equitable relief against the crown. The
* Of the law firm of Lawyer, Lawyer, Ray & Crouch, of Des Moines, Iowa.
1 For a comprehensive article as to the background of the doctrine in Iowa
and the general scope of governmental immunity in Iowa, discussing sub-
stantive rules and procedural aspects applicable to each class of cases
(claims against the state, claims against quasi-corporations or involuntary
sub-divisions, claims against municipal corporations, claims against indi-
vidual public officers, agents, and employees), see 11 Drake L. Rev. 79
(May '62).
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method of obtaining legal relief against the crown was the peti-
tion of right, which stated a claim against the king barred only
by his prerogative. 2 Only out of sixteenth century concepts of
the nature of the state did the king's personal prerogative be-
come the sovereign immunity of the state.
When the individual sovereign was replaced by the broader
concept of the modern state, the idea was carried over that to
allow a suit against a ruling government was inconsistent with
the very idea of supreme executive power.3
In 1788, in his papers on the new constitution, Alexander
Hamilton wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the
general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty is now en-
joyed by the government of every state of the Union. Un-
less, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention, it will remain with the states. The
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign and have no pretension
to compulsive force. They confer no right of action, inde-
pendent of the sovereign will. 4
Early American cases seem to accept the doctrine of the im-
munity of a state from suit in its own courts without question.
In 1857 Chief Justice Taney stated:
It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized
nations that a sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts,
or in any other, without its consent and permission; but it
may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege and permit
itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals or by
another state. And since this permission is altogether vol-
untary on the part of the sovereignty, it follows it . . . may
withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that justice
to the public requires it.5
Some early difficulty arose in the application of the doctrine
to cases brought against a state officer or agency in which the
state itself had not been named as a party. Chief Justice Marshall
2 Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L. Quar.
Rev. 141, 149; 4 Holdsworth, The History of English Law, 202-08 (2 ed.
1937).
3 Prosser, Torts 771 (2 ed. 1955).
4 The Federalist No. 81, at 374 (Hallowell ed. 1842) (Hamilton).
5 Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U. S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857).
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attempted to limit the doctrine in federal courts to those suits in
which the state itself was named as a party on the record,0 but
this limitation was not accepted.
Probably the earliest American case faced squarely with a
challenge of the doctrine was Hans v. Louisiana (1884).7 This
was an action brought in circuit court against the state of
Louisiana by Hans, a citizen of that state, to recover the amount
of certain coupons annexed to the bonds of the state. The state
attorney general filed an exception on the ground that "this
court is without jurisdiction ratione personae. Plaintiff cannot
sue the state without its permission; the Constitution and laws
do not give this honorable court jurisdiction of a suit against
the state." 8
The suit was dismissed and plaintiff brought error. The
sole question, which the Court said was presented for the first
time, was whether the judicial power of the United States ex-
tends to a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States and originally brought against a state by one of
its citizens.
Plaintiff contended that if a case involved a federal ques-
tion the case is within jurisdiction of the federal courts without
regard to the character of the parties (Article III of the Consti-
tution). Plaintiff further contended that the eleventh amend-
ment is no obstacle because it only prohibits suits against a
state which are brought by the citizens of another state.
The Court observed that this contention would present the
anomalous result that in cases arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States, a state may be sued in federal
courts by its own citizens though it cannot be sued for a like
cause by citizens of other states.
The Court further noted that suits and actions unknown to
the law were not contemplated by the Constitution when estab-
lishing the judicial power of the United States. The suability
of a state without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.
Even if the cause lies within federal judicial power by reason
of its character, the scope of the federal judicial power must be
defined in the light of the general principle of state immunity
from suit, and if the citizen suing his own state has not obtained
6 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824).
7 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
8 Id. at 3.
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consent to sue, then federal jurisdiction will not lie, though
otherwise it would.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, in which the judgment
of the circuit court was affirmed, Mr. Justice Bradley reiterated
the blanket acceptance of the courts of the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity.
It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examina-
tion of the reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a
sovereign state from prosecution in a court of justice at the
suit of individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on
public law. It is enough for us to declare its existence. The
legislative department of a state represents its policy and
its will; and is called upon by the highest demands of
natural and political law to preserve justice and judgment,
and to hold inviolate the public obligations. Any departure
from this rule except for reasons most cogent, (of which the
legislature, and not the courts, is the judge,) never fails in
the end to incur the odium of the world, and to bring lasting
injury upon the state itself. But to deprive the legislature
of the power of judging what the honor and safety of the
state may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure
to discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater
evils than such failure can cause.
The method of blind incorporation of the doctrine into the
American law through these early decisions can thus be fol-
lowed, but why the courts so readily accepted a doctrine original-
ly an attribute of a personal ruler is still not clear. It is diffi-
cult to understand why a theory originating in the belief of
the divine right of kings should become so firmly imbedded in
the law of a country which fought to free itself of this tyranny.
Its incorporation into American law has been called "one of the
mysteries of legal evolution." 9
The inviolability of the king was essential to the existence
of his powers as supreme magistrate, but the location of un-
divided sovereignty in the United States is not possible. The
executive in the United States is not historically the sovereign,
and the legislature is restrained by constitutional limitations.
The federal government is one of delegated powers and the
states, although retaining certain powers, are not sovereign (ac-
cording to the Constitution, as demonstrated by the Civil War
and the resulting amendments).
The difficulty of reconciling the royal prerogative with demo-
9 Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 4, 5 (1924).
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cratic government has led some of our courts to deny the ap-
plicability of the English theory of kingly immunity and to
rationalize its acceptance on the ground of public policy. 10
Just what is meant by public policy is equally confusing,
but the general reasoning is that inconvenience and danger
would follow any different rule. Public service would be hin-
dered and public safety endangered if supreme authority could
be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen. In cases in-
volving the use of funds in the public treasury or the exercise
of official discretion, the administration of public affairs could be
controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals in favor of in-
dividual interests."
Some of the excuses given are: that public funds should not
be dissipated to compensate for private injuries; the absence
of funds for satisfaction of judgments; the government derives no
profit from its activities, which are solely for the public benefit;
and the government should not be subjected to the private con-
trol of tort litigation.' 2
Some of the practical reasons given are the lack of jurisdic-
tion, as a court has no authority to render a judgment on which
it has no power to issue execution, and the need to avoid em-
barrassing the executive. 13
Other theories advanced are the dignity of the state; 14 the
absurdity of a wrong committed by an entire people; the idea
that whatever a state does must be lawful; and the doubtful
theory that an agent of the state is always outside the scope of
his authority when he commits a wrongful act. 15
II. Development through court decisions
The theories emitting from the doctrine of governmental
immunity have appeared in cases involving not only the federal
and state governments but also the political subdivisions of the
states. A brief review of its application in various cases shows
the forms the doctrine has taken in different areas of government.
10 E.g., United States v. Lee, 1C6 U. S. 196 (1883); Langford v. United States,
101 U. S. 341 (1879).
11 Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1898).
12 Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877); Prosser, Torts 774 (2 ed. 1955).
13 See cases cited at n. 10 supra.
14 Fitts v. McGhee, supra, n. 11.
15 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1884).
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The peculiar nature of the federal government induced
special rules governing the legal relations arising out of gov-
ernmental invasions of private rights.10 One of the best illus-
trations of the confused reasoning of the courts as to federal im-
munity is in the field of admiralty. In the case of United States
v. Thompson,17 Justice Holmes wrote that a government vessel
could not commit an injury giving rise to a maritime lien, hence
at no time, though the vessel subsequently reached private hands,
could such lien be enforced. This conclusion was derived from
the fact that inasmuch as the lien could never have been en-
forced against the government, the original collision could not
have been a "tort" or an act giving rise to a legal obligation. He
also reasoned that the government could not be guilty of fault
or "tort" since it makes the law and is therefore not bound by
it.
If Justice Holmes' theory is correct, even voluntary sub-
mission to suit would not enable the court to impose damages
on the government, for there never was a liability and none
could be created by merely waiving the immunity from suit.
Such a theory, based on the old concept of the absolutism of the
king, is unsound when applied to the vast network of our fed-
eral government. It finds in the immunity, or the absence of a
legal liability, the absence of injury.
By their adoption of the federal Constitution, the states
have given their consent to be sued in the Supreme Court of
the United States by another state or by the United States.
Neither the laws nor the Constitution gives individuals the right
to sue a state in either federal or state courts. A state's consent
to be sued in its own courts may be expressed in the state consti-
tution but constitutional provisions authorizing or requiring the
legislature to direct by law the manner and courts in which the
state shall be sued are generally regarded as not being self-
executing. No suit can validly be maintained against the state
until the legislature has made proper provisions therefor.18
Such constitutional provision must, it has been held, be
strictly construed since it is in derogation of the state's inherent
exemption from suit.19
16 Borchard, supra, n. 9, 34 Yale L. J. 40, 41.
17 257 U. S. 419 (1922).
18 81 C. J. S., States, 215, at 1304-05 (1953).
19 E.g., State ex rel. Allen v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605, 106 S. W. 2d 858 (1937).
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In state relations the effort to apply the inhibitions of the
eleventh amendment in the federal courts has resulted in a hap-
hazard application of tests to determine merely when a suit di-
rected against an officer or corporate body existing by state
authority is in reality a suit against the state.
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,,9 a Justice Marshall
tried to establish the rule that the eleventh amendment was in-
applicable unless the state was a party to the record. Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 19b rejected this theory and reasoned that the ques-
tion as to whether the state was being sued should be determined
by the effect upon the state of the judgment or decree to be ren-
dered. If the object of the suit is to compel specific performance
of a state contract, or to obtain possession of property of which
the state claims title, or to compel an officer to pay money out of
the state treasury, or to prevent the state from using property
it claims as its own, it is a suit against the state and the federal
courts decline jurisdiction. If the rights of the state would be
directly and adversely affected by the judgment or decree
sought, the state is a necessary party defendant and if it cannot
be made a party, if it has not consented to be sued, the suit is
not maintainable.2 0
The state's immunity has been extended to various state
agencies, such as prisons, hospitals, educational institutions,
state fairs, and commissions for public work, although there is
some tendency to find a legislative intent in creating the agency
that it shall be subject to liability.2 1 In some cases there has
been a resort to the function of the agency in determining its
suability.22 The courts seek to decide whether a corporation
organized by authority of a state is a state agency acting with-
out pecuniary profit or a private corporation acting in private
interests. But it has been held that the governmental or proprie-
tary nature of a particular activity, most often discussed in cases
dealing with the liability of municipal corporations, is immaterial
and cannot be inquired into where questions of immunity from
suit of a state considered as a sovereign arises.23
19a Supra, n. 6.
19b Supra, n. 15.
20 Schwing v. Miles, 367 Ill. 436, 11 N. E. 2d 944, 113 A. L. R. 1504 (1937).
21 Keifer and Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381 (1939).
22 E.g., Scott v. University of Mich. Athletic Ass'n, 152 Mich. 684, 116 N. W.
627 (1908); Green v. State, 107 Wis. 557, 176 N. Y. S. 681 (1919).
23 E.g., Miller v. Port of New York Authority, 18 N. J. Misc. 601, 15 A. 2d
262 (1939); Voorhis v. Cornell Contracting Corp., 10 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (1938).
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The decisions are not harmonious and an attempt to follow
the reasoning applied can be most frustrating. The general re-
luctance of the courts in this area to extend relief to the in-
dividual seems to be based on their belief that public agents will
perform their duties more effectively if not hampered by fear
of tort liability.
For the administration of local government, political sub-
divisions of the state were developed. Included within these so-
called quasi-corporations, (they were not at first incorporated)
are counties, towns, school districts, hospital districts, and the
like. Their kinship to kingly sovereignty is extremely remote,
as the people themselves are closely associated with the man-
agement of these bodies, yet the courts have held them not re-
sponsible for the torts of their agents in the absence of a spe-
cific statute.
Of these political subdivisions the county is the largest. Im-
munity was first extended to it by a court of Massachusetts 24
which relied upon the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon,25
a 1798 case in which the tort action was disallowed on the ground
that there were no corporate funds out of which reparation
could be made and that "it is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an incon-
venience." The only similarity between the Russell case and the
Massachusetts case was that the defendants were both counties.
There was no reason for immunity to be found on the same
basis, but the rule was applied even though there was a cor-
porate fund out of which judgment could have been satisfied.
The Massachusetts court held the defendant was not liable
on the ground that the county was created by the legislature
and as a state agent it was therefore immune. Thus, a decision
based on a case which denied liability for an entirely different
reason became the "common law of the states of the United
States." 20
As the old reasons for immunity disappeared, the courts
looked for other reasons to support their decisions. The majority
followed Massachusetts and gave immunity to the county be-
24 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812).
25 (100 Eng. Rep. 359) This case is often cited as the parent of the doctrine
of governmental immunity.
26 Borchard, supra, n. 9, at 34 Yale L. J. 42.
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cause it was created for public purposes and was an agent of
the state.
The greatest confusion in the decisions of the courts has
been in the area of municipal corporations. This may be due to
the difficulty which arises in an effort to apply the rule that the
municipal corporation is not liable for torts committed by its
agents in performance of governmental functions, but it is liable
when the tort is committed in performance of a proprietary
function.
Municipal corporations have a dual character. They are sub-
divisions of the state charged with governmental functions and
responsibilities. They are also corporate bodies capable 'of much
the same acts as private corporations. The difference between
acts beneficial to the public at large and those beneficial to the
city itself is a fineline test which has not been easy to follow.
Since the doctrine of immunity has been particularly criti-
cized in this area, the courts have developed exceptions to it.
The above mentioned distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions was first declared in 1842 by a New York
court.27 Another frequently applied exception is that the mu-
nicipality is liable if it maintains a nuisance even though in the
course of a governmental function.2 8 This attempt to clarify when
liability should lie may only add to the confusion since liability
for a nuisance often rests on negligence for which the munici-
pality is not liable. The third exception allows recovery when
the injury is caused by the municipality's failure to perform
a duty required by state statute, such as failure to adequately
maintain a road or street which it is under statutory duty to
maintain.2 9
In Linstrom v. Mason CityN° the question arose as to the
distinction, if any, between responsibility of a city to persons
using municipal facilities and liability of other property owners
to invitees. An action was brought against the city for dam-
ages sustained by plaintiff in a fall on steps in a garden area
adjacent to the city library. The court reasoned that the theory
of governmental immunity has faded in the face of statutory
responsibility for streets and public places. In Iowa the city's
27 Baily v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842).
28 Jeakins v. City of El Dorado, 142 Kan. 206, 53 P. 2d 798 (1936).
29 38 Am. Jur., Municipal Corps., 580, and at 274-75 (1941).
30 126 N. W. 2d 292 (Iowa 1964).
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responsibility is statutory. (Sec. 389.12 of the Iowa Code.)
"They shall have the care, supervision, and control of all public
highways, streets, avenues, alleys, public squares, and commons
within the city and shall cause same to be kept open and in re-
pair and free from nuisances."
In connection with governmental functions, the court goes
on, liability of the city does not rest on any theory of respondeat
superior. To that extent there is governmental immunity. There
is no such immunity when the negligence of an employee oc-
curs in performing proprietary duties. It is not complete im-
munity from judicial accountability such as is accorded the
state. It is only freedom from the rule of respondeat superior
where the servant is engaged in governmental activity. The li-
ability of the city rests upon an obligation imposed by law to
keep its thoroughfares and places safe for the public use they
are designed to serve. The statute does not make a city an in-
surer of the safety of users of its streets and public places, but
it does impose a different standard of care than rests upon
private owners. When a city fails to meet this statutory stand-
ard of care, it is liable in tort for resulting injuries.
The idea that the purchase of liability insurance may con-
stitute a waiver of immunity has been considered by some
courts, but the decisions are not in agreement. In Brooks v.
One Motor Bus,31 a South Carolina court took the view that the
city could not waive immunity from tort by taking out public
liability insurance. It stated that there is no statute in the state
which empowers a municipal corporation to waive immunity to
tort liability.
The surrender of an attribute of sovereignty being so much
at variance with the commonly accepted tenets of govern-
ment, so much at variance with sound public policy and
public welfare, the courts will never say that it has been
abrogated, abridged, or surrendered, except in deference
to plain, positive legislative declarations to that effect.3 2
In Tennessee,3 3 however, carrying liability insurance re-
sults in a waiver to the extent of the insurance coverage. The
Illinois appellate court 34 also has held that liability insurance,
31 190 S. C. 379, 3 S. E. 2d 42 (1939).
32 Id. at 43-44.
33 City of Knoxville, Tenn. v. Bailey, 222 F. 2d 520 (6th Cir. 1955).
34 Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist. No. 201, 348 Ill.
App. 567, 109 N. E. 2d 636 (1952).
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to the extent that it protects the public funds, removes the
reason for and thus the immunity to suit. In the majority of
states, however, an immunity continues notwithstanding the
purchase of liability insurance.
III. Reluctance of courts to abolish the doctrine
Many courts have been reluctant to abolish the doctrine of
governmental immunity in spite of a belief that it is no longer
applicable. They feel that a strict adherence to the principle of
stare decisis must be followed because of the reliance of the
parties on prior decisions. Some courts have surmounted this
obstacle by ruling that the doctrine applies in the present case
but that they will not apply it in future cases, thus warning
parties of their future intentions.
In an action3 5 alleging negligent operation of a city's fire
engine, the court held the city was immune from liability, but
went on to criticize the doctrine as an erroneous and illogical
extension of an initial misinterpretation of certain English cases.
The court's feeling was acutely expressed in its opinion.
We are frank to say that if this was a question of first im-
pression, we would be disposed to accept the appellant's
arguments against municipal immunity to suit for tort,
since it would seem to be a matter of common justice that a
loss occasioned by the negligent performance of a function
designed to benefit the community as a whole should fall on
the community generally, rather than upon the hapless in-
dividual injured through no fault of his own. .. . We think,
therefore, in view of the repeated application of the doc-
trine of municipal immunity from suit by our courts, that
we are not at liberty to ignore or overturn it. It is estab-
lished by too long a series of judicial decisions. Any change
must be made by the legislature . . . . Requests for change
of policy involving an overthrow of long settled rules of
law should be addressed to the legislature rather than the
courts. . . . The distinction between governmental and cor-
porate functions of a municipality is at best unsatisfactory,
since all services maintained by the municipality are pre-
sumably for the benefit of the citizens generally. As long
as the distinction is maintained in the law, however, the
courts must cope with it.
In Minnesota the doctrine was rejected but only pro-
spectively. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 62136 in-
35 Flait v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 48 Del. 89, 97 A. 2d 545 (1953).
36 264 Minn. 279, 118 N. W. 2d 795 (1962).
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volved a defective slide in a kindergarten classroom. The plain-
tiff alleged negligence of the school district, teacher and princi-
pal. The action as to the school district was dismissed. By deny-
ing recovery, the court recognized the remainder of the decision
became dictum, but they were unanimous in expressing their in-
tention to overrule the doctrine in the future.
Finding that sovereign immunity is an unjust and archaic
doctrine but recognizing the reliance which has heretofore
been placed on it the court overrules immunity as a defense
available to school districts, municipal corporations, and
other subdivisions of government on whom immunity has
been conferred by judicial decision, with respect to torts
which are committed after adjournment of the next regular
session of the Minnesota legislature, subject, however, to
any statutes which now or hereafter limit or regulate the
prosecution of such claims.
The court made it clear, however, that it was not abolishing
sovereign immunity as to the state itself.
Still another court suggests that a long period of acqui-
escence in the doctrine makes it part of the public policy of the
state and not subject to change by the courts. In McKenzie v.
City of Florence,3 7 plaintiff alleged negligent, reckless, willful
and wanton conduct of police officers in his arrest and imprison-
ment. Plaintiff contended that the acts of the policemen repre-
sented failure on their part to perform their duties as members
of the police department of the city. The City of Florence de-
murred upon the ground that a municipal corporation, an agency
of the state, cannot be sued in tort for acts of police officers ex-
cept when such action is given by statute, and that there is no
legal authority whereby the city is liable in tort for acts of of-
ficers. After noting that the state of South Carolina made no
distinction between municipal activities which are governmental
and those that are proprietary, the court traced the doctrine of
governmental immunity in the state to Young v. Commissioners
of Roads, 2 Nott and McC 537, 11 S. C. L. 537 (1820).
Immunity rule in this state had its inception in approval of
the courts of the Men of Devon case and has been a part of
public policy of this state for one hundred and thirty-nine
years. Acquiescence in it for this period of time justifies the
conclusion that it is now agreeable to, and part of, the pub-
lic policy of the state . . . . To depart from such rule would,
37 234 S. C. 423, 108 S. E. 2d 825 (1959).
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of necessity, overrule many decisions of this court. . . . This
court is not invested with the power to make laws.3 8
The McKenzie case also proffered the idea that since the
legislature has partly modified the rule in some respect, they
have already legislated with respect to the remaining effects of
the rule. The court reasoned that by enacting various statutes
affecting immunity, the legislature has determined that no fur-
ther change is to be made by the courts. This court even went
further to contend that the legislature had shown its intent not
to abolish the doctrine if bills concerning it had not been passed.
It appears that concurring with the idea that the court must
adhere to a strict rule of stare decisis is the thought that only
the legislature can make changes in public policy of the state.
Another South Carolina case 39 flatly states that since the
courts have over such a long period of time consistently follow-
ed the rule of immunity, it should not be changed except by
legislative enactment. That court distinguishes between the
establishment of public policy by the court where none on the
subject exists and the overthrow by the courts of existing pub-
lic policy. The idea being that once firmly rooted, such policy
becomes in effect a rule of conduct or of property within the
state and the courts should leave it to the people, through their
elected representatives, to say whether or not it should be re-
vised or discarded.
In Maffei v. Town of Kemmerer,40 the court also followed
the reasoning that the legislature must make any changes in the
doctrine because of its long standing. This was an action for
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent through the negligence of
police officers in directing him to assist in pursuit of a felon.
Although,
a rule of law which is merely the product of judicial
decision, born of the necessities of particular circumstances
is subject to judicial repudiation when the reasons which
rise to its judicial adoption have failed or not longer exist...
an ancient doctrine firmly imbedded in . . . common law
and which became that law through early usage and custom,
cannot be judicially abrogated any more than courts are au-
thorized to abolish statutory law because in their opinion
the reason for the legislative enactment no longer justifies
38 Id. at 828.
39 Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S. C. 567, 106 S. E. 2d 258 (1958).
40 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P. 2d 808 (1959).
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the continuance of the law. That which is considered to be
the merit of a law is not the criterion upon which courts
base their decisions as to the law's continued existence.4
This Court took a somewhat exceptional view as to the
origin of the doctrine, repudiating the often quoted statement
that it stemmed from the English case of Men of Devon. Accord-
ing to the court's research, the Devon decision cited a case from
Brooke's Abridgment as direct authority to show that no ac-
tion against the public could be maintained. Thus, this Court
rejected the Florida court's assumption (Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, infra) that the 1788 judicial recognition of the
common law of England amounted to a court-originated doc-
trine. The Devon case only gave recognition to a principle
which had appeared in an earlier decision rendered at least prior
to 1558.42 Based on this contention, the court felt it seemed
more logical to conclude the doctrine was already a part of the
common law, engrafted therein through long usage and custom.
The state statute says the common law of England prior to
the fourth year of James I (1607) "shall be the rule of decision
in this state." Thus by statute, the Wyoming court reasons, the
doctrine of municipal immunity became the rule of decision in
our state and it is only by statute that the doctrine should be
abrogated.
IV. Abolition of the doctrine by some courts
One of the initial attempts to abrogate the doctrine was
made in 1957 in the case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
Florida,4 '  a wrongful death action. Plaintiff's husband was
locked in the city jail for the night because intoxicated. The
cell became filled with smoke and he suffocated. No one was on
duty at the jail at that time. Defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground of immunity was granted and the plaintiff appealed.
The Florida court took the view that the idea that it is better
for an individual to suffer a wrong than to impose vicarious li-
ability on the public is inconsistent with the constitutional guar-
antee that the courts shall always be open to redress wrongs
and "to our sense of justice that there shall be a remedy for
41 Id. at 816.
42 The author of Brooke's Abridgments died in 1558.
43 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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every wrong committed." 44 In regard to the contention that only
the legislature could act to abolish governmental immunity be-
cause the doctrine was statutory through Florida statutory ac-
ceptance of common law, the court voiced the opinion that this
ignored both the fact that Men of Devon postdates American
independence and the fact that the courts are competent to act
independently of the legislature in an area of law which the
courts originated.
To the argument that the courts should follow the doctrine
of stare decisis, the court refused to remain blindly loyal, stating
that the law is not static and that:
Our laws are the product of progressive thinking which
attunes traditional concepts to needs and demands of chang-
ing times . . . . We now recede from the prior cases in
order to establish a rule we are convinced will be produc-
tive of results more nearly consonant with the demands of
justice. 45
In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302,46 the
Illinois court held the doctrine of immunity had no further ef-
fect in that state. The supreme court of Illinois agreed with
the Hargrove opinion that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an
inflexible rule and that when public policy and social needs re-
quire a departure from prior decisions, it is the duty of the court
to overrule those decisions. The court stated that it is a basic
concept underlying the whole law of torts today that liability
follows negligence and that individuals and corporations are
responsible for the negligence of their agents and employees
acting in the course of their employment. The doctrine of im-
munity runs directly counter to that basic concept.
In 1962, the supreme court of Wisconsin held the doctrine
of sovereign immunity would not be available as a defense in
the suit of Holytz v. City of Milwaukee4 7 or any future case. In
a 1959 case 48 the same court had made the statement that "re-
cent attempts in the Wisconsin legislature to abolish the tort im-
munity have failed. This is strong evidence of legislative intent
that such immunity should not be abolished." But in spite of
44 Id. at 132.
45 Id. at 133.
46 11 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N. E. 2d 89 (1959).
47 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N. W. 2d 618 (1962).
48 Smith v. City of Jefferson, 8 Wis. 2d 378, 99 N. W. 2d 119 (1959).
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such strong language, in the Holytz case, the court made no
elaborate excuses for its change of position. It simply stated,
We are satisfied that the governmental immunity doctrine
has judicial origins. Upon careful consideration, we are
now of the opinion that it is appropriate for this court to
abolish this immunity notwithstanding the legislature's
failure to adopt corrective enactments.
In Michigan 49 four justices joined in the opinion overruling
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and asking for prospective
operation which would not prevent the plaintiff from recovering
and four justices refused to overturn the doctrine. Mr. Justice
Black wrote a separate opinion asking for repudiation of the doc-
trine to operate wholly prospectively. The minority opinion
based their argument that repudiation was a legislative task on
a separation of powers theory. The majority relied on four
years of legislative inaction 0 plus decisions in other jurisdictions
overruling the doctrine.
One of the most lucid opinions is that of Justice Traynor in
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District.5 1 This action against a
hospital district was predicated upon the alleged negligence of
the hospital staff in treating the plaintiff. The superior court
sustained the demurrer of the defendant on the ground of gov-
ernmental immunity from tort liability. In its reversal, the su-
preme court held that the doctrine would be rejected as mis-
taken and unjust.
Justice Traynor made the following observations in his per-
suasive opinion. After first determining that the rule of county
or local district immunity did not originate with the concept
of sovereign immunity but with Russell v. Men of Devon in
which recovery was disallowed on the grounds of no funds and
that the public should not suffer the inconvenience, he says, "If
the reasons for Russell v. Men of Devon ever had any substance
they have none today. Public convenience does not outweigh
individual compensation and the county hospital is an entity
legally and financially capable of satisfying a judgment." He fur-
ther contends, "None of the reasons for its continuance can
49 Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N. W. 2d 1 (1961).
50 See, Richards v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N. W. 2d
643 (1957) in which the court stated that the remedy to the problem of
governmental immunity lies with the legislature.
51 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961).
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withstand analysis. No one defends total governmental im-
munity. In fact, it does not exist. It has become riddled with
exceptions, both legislative and judicial, and the exceptions
operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality." 52
He points out that some injured by government agencies
can recover while others cannot and cites as examples the case
of Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto53 in which one injured while at-
tending a community theater in a public park recovered and
the case of Farrell v. City of Long Beach54 in which recovery
was not allowed to one injured in a children's playground.
Justice Traynor felt the illogical and inequitable extreme had
been reached in the Muskopf case. To affirm the rule would
deny recovery to one injured in a county or hospital district
hospital but might allow recovery in a city and county hospital.
Two of the basic arguments advanced to deny the courts'
power to remove governmental immunity are:
1. That by enacting various statutes affecting immunity, the
legislature has determined that no further change is to be made
by the court.
2. By force of stare decisis the rule has become so firmly
entrenched that only the legislature can change it.
As to the first, Justice Traynor refutes it by holding that a
series of sporadic statutes, each operating on a separate area of
governmental immunity where its evil was felt most, is not
comprehensive legislative enactment designed to cover a field.
As to the second, he feels that the rule of governmental im-
munity has not existed with the force that its repetition would
imply. Both judicial and legislative restrictions are constantly
being placed upon it.
Justice Traynor concluded by stating that abrogation of
governmental immunity does not mean that the state is liable
for all harm that results from its activities, but once it has been
determined that the state through its agents has committed a
tort, it must meet its obligation therefor.
Nor does our . .. decision affect the settled rules of im-
munity of government officials for acts within the scope of
their authority . . . . Government officials are liable for
52 Id. at 460.
53 100 Cal. App. 2d 336, 223 P. 2d 639 (1950).
54 132 Cal. App. 2d 818, 283 P. 2d 296 (1955).
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
negligent performance of their ministerial duties but are
not liable for discretionary acts within the scope of their
authority . . . . "The justification for doing so is that it is
impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until
the case is tried . . . . In this instance it has been thought
in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their
duty to the constant dread of retaliation." (Learned Hand,
J., in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d. 579, 581.) This im-
munity rests on grounds entirely independent of those ad-
vanced to justify immunity of state from liability for torts
for which agents are admittedly liable....
Thus, in holding that the doctrine of governmental immunity for
torts for which its agents are liable has no place in our law, we
make no startling break with the past, but merely take the final
step that carries to its conclusion an established legislative and
judicial trend.55
Two years later in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commis-
sion,5r the court deciding that case felt the reasoning of Muskopf
was valid and completely abrogated the doctrine in Arizona.
That court, after noting most writers claim the only basis of
survival of the doctrine has been on the ground of antiquity
and inertia and that the doctrine has been overruled in England,
went on to unquestionably assert that they were reversing their
past position. In previous decisions this Court concurred in the
reasoning that the principle had become so firmly fixed that
change must come from the legislature. "Upon reconsideration,
we realize the doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally
judicially created. We are now convinced that a court-made rule,
when unjust or outmoded, does not necessarily become with
age invulnerable to judicial attack." 57
V. Situation since some courts abrogated the doctrine
In Illinois, after the Molitor case, the legislature reacted to
the situation by reinstating tort immunity with respect to a
number of government subdivisions.
Following the Muskopf case, the California legislature
promptly declared a moratorium on this and other claims simi-
larly situated. Two years later the legislature again passed
55 Muskopf, supra, n. 51, at 462-63.
56 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P. 2d 107 (1963).
57 Id. at 113.
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laws on the subject of immunity and the intermediate appellate
court held the effect of both enactments was to merely suspend
operation of the Muskopf decision. 58
The future trend is still very uncertain in Wisconsin and
Minnesota where the doctrine was prospectively abandoned in
the Holytz case and the Spanel case since the bulk of those de-
cisions were dictum. The Holytz case stated that even though
that case related specifically to the city, the abrogation of the
doctrine should be considered as total. The Minnesota court
was not so bold. It specified its intention was to abolish im-
munity as a defense for school districts, municipal corporations
and other subdivisions of the government, subject to legislative
action, and expressly excluded the state. In 1965 the Minnesota
legislature authorized a waiver of immunity as to certain claim-
ants. In Michigan subsequent opinions59 to the Williams case
made it clear that only municipal corporations were affected by
that decision. Following Hargrove, the Florida court also limited
its position by saying that the abolition of immunity as to gov-
ernmental functions of municipalities does not apply to the
state, its counties and county school boards.60
Colorado had taken an early lead in 1957 in the case of
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n. 1 "In Colorado
sovereign immunity may be a proper subject for discussion by
students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this
Court." This feeling was short lived, however, for three years
later the same court invoked the immunity theory as to gov-
ernmental functions of a county.6 2
New Jersey takes the position that complete immunity does
not exist. It imposes liability for injurious acts performed by
a municipality in its governmental capacity when these acts
constitute active wrongdoing as distinguished from negligent
failure to act.63
The tug of war as to whether legislative action or judicial
58 Bell v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 36 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Cal. App. 1964).
59 Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764 (Fla. App. 1960); Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138
So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1962).
60 McDowell v. Mackie, 365 Mich. 268, 112 N. W. 2d 491 (1962); Sayers v.
School Dist. No. 1, 366 Mich. 217, 114 N. W. 2d 191 (1962); Stevens v. City of
St. Clair Shores, 366 Mich. 341, 115 N. W. 2d 69 (1962).
61 136 Colo. 279, 284, 316 P. 2d 582, 585 (1957).
62 Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P. 2d 590 (1960).
63 McAndrews v. Mularchuck, 33 N. J. 172, 162 A. 2d 820 (1960).
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action should be followed in dealing with the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity still continues and it appears that it will
be some time before enough weight is thrown on one side to give
any certainty as to how the matter will be handled in the
courts.
An excellent review of the various positions taken by the
courts is given by the Iowa supreme court in Boyer v. Iowa
High School Athletic Ass'n.6 4 In this action to recover for per-
sonal injuries to two spectators from the collapse of bleachers
at a high school basketball tournament the county district court
sustained the defendant school district's motion to dismiss on
the ground of governmental immunity. In a five to four decision
the supreme court affirmed the district court. Justice Garfield
made the following comment in support of the majority opinion:
"We think the experience of the few states where the court has
attempted to abrogate the immunity doctrine indicates legislative
action is a better solution." 65 He makes this comment after citing
some recent cases abrogating the doctrine in one area or another
and points out that the decisions are followed by legislative en-
actment or confined to a limited area in the court's opinion or
in subsequent cases.
In the dissent Justice Moore makes a strong plea for ju-
dicial abrogation of the doctrine.
The majority opinion does not dispute the modern trend
which recognizes the immunity rule is unjust, unsupported
by any valid reason and has no rightful place in modern
society, but refuses to follow the holding of an overwhelm-
ing majority of the more recent cases that being court made
the rule should be eliminated by its creator. To hold the
legislature should bury this court's mistakes of the past
seems as illogical as the rule itself.66
He concludes that "it is our responsibility and duty to alter
decisional law to produce common sense justice." 67
VI. Conclusion
Since no justification for the retention of the rule of gov-
ernmental immunity remains other than that the courts are
64 127 N. W. 2d 606 (Iowa 1964).
65 Id. at 609.
66 Id. at 614.
67 Id. at 618.
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bound by stare decisis and should give deference to the legis-
lature, it seems a gross flaw in our system of justice to leave
the situation as it is. Even in those courts which adhere to the
rule, the opinions indicate a desire to be relieved of its shackles.
The cases holding that the courts themselves should abro-
gate the rule of governmental immunity and those maintaining
that only the legislature is qualified to act should be considered
together to arrive at the best solution. If the courts alone at-
tempt to abolish the rule, inadequate piecemeal rules of law
which would apply in some cases and not in others would
evolve. Since each case usually involves only one area of im-
munity, the question as to whether that decision would apply
in another area under different circumstances would remain.
The legislature could define the extent to which the rule is
abolished and give concrete standards for the courts to follow.
However, other than the theory that the legislature should
handle questions of public policy and that they are better able
to remedy the problem, there is no valid reason why the courts
must wait for the legislature to act. While legislative action,
as a solution to this problem, would give more uniformity to
subsequent case decisions, it appears that most state legisla-
tures are reluctant to take this responsibility until prodded into
action by the courts. The courts, therefore, must take the in-
itiative as an impetus to obtaining appropriate legislation.
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